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Impending Danger: The Meaning 
of Danger as a Legal Requirement 
for Involuntary Psychiatric 




Danger is an increasingly central phenomenon in the Norwegian criminal justice 
system.1 It is at the heart of retrospective considerations of certain criminalised acts, 
and may have implications for evaluations of excuses and defences. Danger is also 
utilised in a prospective sense, in provisions aimed at avoiding feared and unwant-
ed future actions from certain individuals. The Norwegian Penal Code section 62, 
which regulates the (possibly indefinite) involuntary psychiatric treatment of crimi-
nally insane (utilregnelige) offenders, is such a rule.2 
1 According to Andenæs, The Norwegian Penal Code (LOV-2005-05-20-28 om straff) contains 
more ‘danger delicts’ than the previous Penal Code of 1902 (LOV-1902-05-22-10 Almindelig 
borgerlig straffelov). See Andenæs, Alminnelig strafferett – 6th ed. by Rieber-Mohn and Sæther 
(Universitetsforlaget 2016), p. 109. ‘Danger delicts’ (faredelikt) are criminal offences with the 
central characteristic that the offender is responsible for giving rise to danger of a harmful effect.
2 LOV-2005-05-20-28 om straff. Other examples are the rules regulating remand detention 
and isolation during remand detention in the Criminal Proceedings Act (LOV-1981-05-22-
25 om rettergang i straffesaker), section 171 ref. sections 184 and 186 a, and the rule allowing 
indeterminate sentencing of criminally sane offenders in the Penal Code section 40.
* Advisor at Haukeland University Hospital, Department of Forensic Psychiatry, Centre for 
Research and Education. I am indebted to my colleagues at the Centre for Research and 
Education for the time taken to give valuable feedback on earlier drafts. I have also benefitted 
from thorough comments from an anonymous reviewer for which I am very grateful.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 1/2019
111
In governmental proposition 154 L (2016-2017), the Ministry of Justice and Public 
Security suggested a revision to the Penal Code section 62. In the proposal, which 
has now been accepted by the parliament, greater emphasis is placed on the require-
ment that there is a danger of recurring offences in future cases.3 The question of how 
danger is to be understood is, therefore, key to understanding this provision. 
This paper makes a preliminary analysis of the central sources of law in an effort 
to reveal the meaning of danger in the context of Penal Code section 62.4 I will iden-
tify several problematic issues which are not resolved in the recent revision. I will ar-
gue that the lack of a clear definition of danger and a variance in what dimensions are 
included in its assessment is apt to cause arbitrariness in the application of the rule. 
As a result, foreseeing whether or not a criminally insane offender will be subjected 
to involuntary psychiatric treatment becomes a challenging task. 
The paper is organised as follows: section two presents the rule in question and 
the proposal for revision, section three discusses the legal definitions of the danger 
requirement, section four analyses factors used in the assessment of danger, section 
five examines the factual assumptions under which danger assessments are made, 
and section six draws conclusions from reflections on the findings. 
2. Penal Code Section 62 
2.1 Overview
Penal Code section 62 currently contains the following provisions for sentencing of-
fenders to involuntary psychiatric treatment:
‘When deemed necessary to protect the life, health or freedom of other persons, an of-
fender who is exempt from punishment pursuant to section 20, letter b) or d), may be 
sentenced to psychiatric care, see chapter 5 of the Mental Health Care Act, when he has 
committed or attempted to commit a violent offence, sexual offence, unlawful imprison-
ment, arson or another offence that has violated the life, health or freedom of another 
person or could have posed a danger to these legal interests, and the conditions in the 
second or third paragraphs are met. Committal to psychiatric care, see chapter 5 of the 
Mental Health Care Act, may also be imposed on an offender who is exempt from pun-
ishment pursuant to section 20, b) or d), if he has committed repeat offences that are 
harmful to society or particularly bothersome, if it is necessary to protect society or other 
3 Parliament decision, Lovvedtak 60 (2018-2019) ref. committee recommendation, Innst. 296 L 
(2018-2019) ref. governmental proposal from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, Prop. 
154 L (2016-2017).
4 The legal sources examined include statutory provisions, legislative preparatory works, legal 
literature, and a sample of Norwegian Supreme Court verdicts concerning section 39 of the 
former Penal Code of 1902 and section 62 of the current Penal Code for the period 2003-2017, 
with excerpts from the preceding High Court verdicts.
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persons against such offences and the conditions in the fourth paragraph are met.
If the offence was of a serious nature, there must be an impending danger that the of-
fender will again commit a serious offence that violates or endangers the life, health or 
freedom of another person.
If the offence was less serious in nature
a) the offender must previously have committed or attempted to commit a serious 
offence that violated or endangered the life, health or freedom of another person,
b) there must be a presumption of a close connection between the earlier and the 
present offence, and
c) the danger of commission of a further serious offence as specified in a) must be 
particularly impending.
If the offences were harmful to society or particularly bothersome, the danger of further 
offences of the same type must be particularly impending, and other measures must have 
proven to be clearly unsuitable.
When assessing the danger of recidivism pursuant to this provision, emphasis shall be 
put on the committed offence with a particular reference to the offender’s conduct, illness 
development and mental functional capacity.’5 
As we can see, section 62 contains two types of sanctions. First, a ‘serious offences’ 
sanction that is potentially life-long, and secondly, a ‘bothersome’ sanction that has a 
limited duration of a maximum of three years. 
5 No official translation has been made of the Norwegian Penal Code into English. My own 
translation here presented differs somewhat from other available translations, which do not, in 
my view, adequately convey the actual meaning of the terms used in the original:
‘Når det anses nødvendig for å verne andres liv, helse eller frihet, kan en lovbryter som er straffri 
etter § 20 bokstav b eller bokstav d, ved dom overføres til tvungent psykisk helsevern, jf. psykisk 
helsevernloven kapittel 5, når han har begått eller forsøkt å begå et voldslovbrudd, et seksuallovbrudd, 
en frihetsberøvelse, en ildspåsettelse eller et annet lovbrudd som krenket andres liv, helse eller frihet eller 
kunne utsette disse rettsgodene for fare og vilkårene i annet eller tredje ledd er oppfylt. Overføring til 
tvungent psykisk helsevern, jf. psykisk helsevernloven kapittel 5, kan også idømmes en lovbryter som er 
straffri etter § 20 bokstav b eller bokstav d når han har begått gjentatte lovbrudd av samfunnsskadelig 
eller særlig plagsom art, dersom det er nødvendig for å verne samfunnet eller andre borgere mot slike 
lovbrudd og vilkårene i fjerde ledd er oppfylt. 
Var lovbruddet av alvorlig art, må det være en nærliggende fare for at lovbryteren på nytt vil begå et alvorlig 
lovbrudd som krenker eller utsetter for fare andres liv, helse eller frihet. 
Var lovbruddet av mindre alvorlig art må
a) lovbryteren tidligere ha begått eller forsøkt å begå et alvorlig lovbrudd som krenket eller utsatte for fare 
andres liv, helse eller frihet,
b) det antas å være en nær sammenheng mellom det tidligere og det nå begåtte lovbruddet, og
c) faren for tilbakefall til et nytt alvorlig lovbrudd som nevnt i bokstav a, være særlig nærliggende.
Var lovbruddene av samfunnsskadelig eller særlig plagsom art, må faren for nye lovbrudd av samme art være 
særlig nærliggende, og andre tiltak må ha vist seg åpenbart uhensiktsmessige.
Ved vurderingen av faren for tilbakefall etter bestemmelsen her skal det legges vekt på det begåtte lovbruddet 
sammenholdt særlig med lovbryterens atferd, sykdomsutvikling og psykiske funksjonsevne.’
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The ‘serious offences’ sanction allows involuntary psychiatric treatment of criminal-
ly insane offenders who have committed, or attempted to commit, an offence that 
violates, or poses a danger to individual life, health or freedom. The categories of 
qualifying index offences (the offence that brought the offender into contact with the 
criminal justice system) cover a wide range, spanning from homicide to hijacking, 
cybercrime, aggravated robbery, and threats.6  
As long as the required threshold for intervention is met, the imposition of these 
sanctions may be continued.7 A case for continuation must, however, be presented to 
the district court within three years after the last valid verdict.8 In addition, the con-
victed person may request a re-examination of the requirements every twelve months, 
and the prosecutor’s office may lift the sanctions at any time. Both in cases regarding 
the establishment of sanctions and in cases regarding the continuation of sanctions, 
it is common that forensic experts make evaluations of the defendant on behalf of the 
courts, including assessments of whether the defendant poses a risk for violence.9 
The ‘bothersome’ sanction is intended for criminally insane offenders who have 
committed repeat offences considered harmful to society or particularly bother-
some.10 Frequent offences that violate the integrity or private sphere of citizens are 
6 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) pp. 123-124, further reference to governmental 
proposal, Prop. 122 L (2014-2015) p. 35, and governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 90 (2003-2004) 
p. 459, with further reference to governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 107.  
7 See Penal Code section 65. 
8 Ibid. For more on the role of the prosecution office, see Holst (2019) ‘Court-Ordered Compulsory 
Psychiatric Care and the Prosecutor’s Control Function’ Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice, 7(1) (2019), pp 136-147.
9 The Criminal Proceedings Act, section 165, states that a forensic examination of the defendant 
must always be performed when considering whether to impose sanctions under section 62 of the 
Penal Code. Further regulation of the role of expert witnesses is found in the Criminal Proceedings 
Act chapter 11, where it is stated that: anyone appointed by the Court in principle may not decline 
the appointment (section 138); unless the Court deems otherwise necessary, there will normally 
be appointed one expert (section 139); that the involved parties should be given the chance to 
comment on the choice of expert (section 141); and that the expert may be present during the 
court proceedings and be allowed to pose questions to the parties, witnesses and other experts 
(section 144). Although no requirements for formal competency or special authorisation apply, the 
appointed forensic expert will normally be a private practicing psychiatrist or specialist psychologist, 
see Mælandrapporten (2013) cited in the Ministry’s proposal, Prop. L 154 (2016-2017) p. 180. 
10 These sanctions were included in a revision of section 62 that came into effect October 2016. 
Although they may be considered less substantial than the potential life-long measures for the 
first category, the use of sanctions under the Penal Code for offences generally considered harmful 
or bothersome has been subject to critique from all related fields including the forensic and legal. 
Governmental proposition, Prop. 122 L (2014-2015) p. 22, contains a list of negative or sceptical 
institutions, including the Norwegian Directorate of Health, Helse Bergen, Haukeland University 
Hospital (Psychiatric Division), Lovisenberg Hospital, the Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology, Oslo University Hospital HF, Ullevål (Psychiatric division and Regional Security 
Department), Pro-Legal, the Norwegian Medical Association, the Norwegian Union for Criminal 
Reform (KROM), and the Norwegian Association for Persons with Intellectual Disabilities. 
114
Martin Mindestrømmen
the core target, and aggravated theft is, for instance, a qualifying index offence.11 
Here also, the threshold for intervention must be met if sanctions are to be upheld.12 
Likewise, assessments of the defendant by forensic experts are common. Under these 
sanctions, the convicted may request a re-examination every six months.13 
It has been argued in the literature that the sanctions in section 62 should be 
reserved for a narrow range of offenders.14 This is primarily because the criminally 
insane are not accountable, and because the sanctions infringe on the ‘asylum sov-
ereignty’ (asylsuvereniteten) of mental health service institutions, i.e., their exclusive 
competency to decide whether a patient shall be submitted into care or not.15 As 
of 20 December 2018, 220 persons are serving a sentence under section 62. Out of 
these, 209 are serving on the grounds of the first category (danger of serious future 
offences), and 11 on the grounds of the second category (being particularly bother-
some to society).16 
The following discussion focuses on the first category and issues relating to the 
requirement that there is a danger of future serious offences. 
Since the purpose of the provision is societal protection, sanctions under sec-
tion 62 cannot be established based on a need for treatment, or the need to protect 
economic interests, alone.17 In addition to specifying which offences must have been 
proven, the rule in section 62 sets two fundamental requirements for the use of in-
voluntary psychiatric treatment: a danger of certain future offences must be present, 
and the use of such a sanction must be deemed necessary to protect society. 
In an earlier governmental proposal, which forms the basis for the current rule, 
the legislator explains that protective necessity is the basic condition for the applica-
tion of the sanction.18 Hence, whether or not there is a danger is an element in the 
evaluation of whether the basic condition is met:  
11 HR-2017-2249-A. 
12 See Penal Code section 65. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Gröning et al, Frihet, forbrytelse og straff – En systematisk fremstilling av norsk strafferett 
(Fagbokforlaget 2016) pp. 652-653, and Jacobsen, Dom på overføring til tvungent psykisk 
helsevern – Straffeloven § 39 (Fagbokforlaget 2004) pp. 50-51.  
15 Gröning et al. (2016) pp. 652-653, and Jacobsen (2004) pp. 50-51. On the meaning of the term, 
‘asylum sovereignty’, see, for instance, Sandberg, ‘Asylsuvereniteten, Rett og urett’, Tidsskriftet 
den norske legeforening, 10 (2001) p. 1287. For more on the respective roles of the prosecution 
service and the mental health care institution during the commitment, see Holst (2019).
16 Numbers provided by the National Coordination Unit for Penal Sanctions on Compulsory 
Psychiatric Care, in a personal e-mail to the author. 
17 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop 154 L (2016-2017) p. 123 and Gröning et al. (2016) p. 652, with 
further reference to Matningsdal, Straffeloven: lov 20. Mai 2005 nr 28 om straff: alminnelige 
bestemmelser: kommentarutgave (Gyldendal 2015) p. 583. 
18 Ot.prp.nr. 87 (1993-1994), p. 106.
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‘[Necessity] deals with the basic condition for the use of sanctions under section 62. The 
sanction must be considered necessary to protect society. The court must make a discre-
tionary assessment of whether sanctions under section 62 should be applied. Relevant 
factors in the assessment are the seriousness of the crime committed, the probability/like-
lihood19 of repeat offences, the seriousness of the feared offence and the offender’s mental 
state. It must also be taken into consideration what society has to offer the offender apart 
from sanctions under section 62, e.g., through the Mental Health Care Act.’20 
In later preparatory works, the legislator emphasises necessity and danger as separate 
requirements.21 According to the legislator, the courts have, contrary to this, dealt 
with both danger and necessity in an overall assessment. This is considered unfortu-
nate, as, in the legislator’s view, there might occur situations where a sufficient danger 
is present but where the use of involuntary psychiatric treatment is not necessary.22 
For instance, where the perceived danger is sufficiently managed through voluntary 
or involuntary civil psychiatric treatment measures already in place at the time of the 
judgement, or where the mental state of the offender has changed.23 
As will become clearer in the analysis of the Supreme Court cases in section 5 
below, the different views on the relationship between the danger and necessity re-
quirements might be representative of a somewhat different interpretation of the 
rule’s legal meaning. Among the possible legal interpretations, a main division can 
perhaps be made between a rule that includes the temporal dimension, the current 
treatment regime, and the offender’s current mental state in the danger assessment, 
and a rule that locates such factors in the necessity assessment.  
The latter alternative arguably presupposes that danger is something that can be 
established isolated from the offender’s actual and/or expected future situation at the 
time of the judgement. Conversely, in the former alternative, the offender’s situation 
will be highly relevant for the assessment of danger. How one interprets the legal 
meaning of danger can in this way influence the final outcome, as may be illustrated 
with the Supreme Court case Rt. 2006 p. 1143. Here, a sufficient treatment regime in 
which the offender was already enrolled led to a negative conclusion on the danger 
requirement, making a necessity evaluation superfluous.24 
Furthermore, a relative threshold for intervention is discussed in the preparatory 
works, where the question of whether danger is present is seen as dependent both 
19 The Norwegian word sannsynlig is the applied term. It covers both probability and likelihood. As 
a result, it can be hard to tell which one is meant, and I have therefore included both.  
20 The author’s translation from governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 106. Some 
minor alterations in the translated text have been made for the purpose of semantic clarification. 
21 See, for instance, governmental proposal, Prop. 122 L (2014-2015) pp. 35-40, where available 
alternative measures are still seen as part of the necessity evaluation. 
22 Governmental proposal, Prop. 122 L (2014-2015) p. 40.
23 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 106, and governmental proposal, Prop. 
122 L (2014-2015) p. 40.
24 See section 5 below. 
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on the seriousness of the committed offence and on the seriousness of potential fu-
ture offences.25 Only the former was, however, included in the rule itself. Section 62 
requires an ‘impending danger’ if the committed offence was serious, and a ‘partic-
ularly impending danger’ if the committed offence was less serious. For the less seri-
ous offences, a previous offence or attempted offence that violated or endangered the 
life, health or freedom of others, and a presumption of a close connection between 
the earlier and present offence, form additional requirements, as stated in section 62 
third paragraph, letters a and b.26 A proposal to change this has now been accepted. 
2.2 Accepted Revision
In the aftermath of the 22 July terrorist attacks, a committee was tasked with inves-
tigating the need for legislative change to the rules on criminal insanity (utilregnel-
ighet) and related issues. The resulting report, NOU 2014: 10, criticised the differen-
tiation in section 62 between earlier serious and less serious criminal offences, and 
suggested its removal.27 So also the requirement of a previous serious violation.28 It 
pointed out that the purpose of section 62 is to secure such legal values as the life, 
health and freedom of others for the future, and that the threat posed to these values 
is not necessarily dependent on the seriousness of the offence that has already been 
committed. Rather, the report argued that the ‘level of danger required should be 
higher when the value at stake is of relatively lower importance, but should be mark-
edly lower when a particularly significant value, such as life, is threatened, for exam-
ple where there is a risk of murder.’29 
In governmental proposition 154 L (2016-2017), the Ministry of Justice and Pub-
lic Security proposed to follow the committee’s advice for such a revision of section 
62. More specifically, the Ministry suggested the requirement be formulated as a de-
mand that the sanctions are necessary for the protection of society, and that the danger 
of a new and serious integrity violation is impending.30  This danger shall be assessed 
25 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 108. 
26 In establishing whether a previous offence has taken place, the legislator assumes that it essentially 
will be required to apply the same standard of evidence as for a criminal conviction – in dubio 
pro reo. See governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p.107. So also in legal theory and 
jurisprudence, e.g., Jacobsen (2004) p. 126 onwards, and Matningsdal, The Penal Code commentary 
(Gyldendal 2018), https://min.rettsdata.no/Dokument/gL20050520z2D28 (last accessed 9th 
September 2019), note 477 and 279, with further reference to Supreme Court verdicts Rt. 2004 p. 
209, Rt. 2004 p. 606 and Rt. 2004 p. 1953. In the evaluation of other circumstances, the required 
standard of evidence has been considered somewhat lower; see Jacobsen (2004) pp. 119 onwards.
27 Gröning and Rieber-Mohn, ‘Proposal for New Rules Regarding Criminal Insanity and Related Issues, 
Norway post-22 July’, Bergen Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 3(1) (2015) pp. 126-127.
28 Idem., p. 127. 
29 Ibid.
30 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) p. 236.
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independently of the seriousness of the index crime, but relative to the seriousness 
of the feared crime.31 As acknowledged by the Ministry, this will entail a shift in the 
courts’ assessment of danger from the previous emphasis on what the offender has 
done to the more uncertain question of what the offender might do.32 The question 
then arises as to how the legislator has intended the courts to deal with this increas-
ing uncertainty. As we shall see, general legal principles may entail some constraints. 
Leaving the decision on who is to be detained in psychiatric institutions entirely 
up to the courts’ discretion would certainly relieve the legislator of much difficulty. 
Constructing a rule that allows the courts to detain whoever the courts believe to be 
dangerous does not raise many technical legal issues, as a mere reference to danger 
could be sufficient to communicate what it is the court is asked to do. Such a rule 
would, however, leave the door open for mere speculation and value judgements, 
that, in light of rule-of-law values such as legal clarity, legal predictability, and equali-
ty before the law, could be considered problematic.33 
The opposite approach, which from a legislative perspective is more demanding, 
is to limit the courts’ discretion by setting requirements for what is legally relevant to 
take into consideration, and thus increase the foreseeability of the application of the 
rule. This would not necessarily exclude discretionary assessments altogether, but it 
could provide a framework for the courts’ exercise of discretion, and thereby bring 
the application of the law closer to the ideal—that different judges, when presented 
with the same case, would examine the same evidentiary topics and hopefully reach 
the same conclusions. 
How the section 62 rule fits in with this illustrative dichotomy will largely depend 
on what requirements the criterion of impending danger actually creates for the legal 
decision maker’s assessment. In the following three sections, we shall examine this 
closer. 
3. Defining the Danger Requirement
3.1 What is an ‘Impending Danger’?
What is the meaning of an impending danger? At least three interrelated challenges 
arise in an attempt at an answer. First, it must be further explained what concept im-
31 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) pp. 134-141.
32 Ibid. 
33 For a disquieting illustration of such value judgements, see Ashworth and Zedner, Preventive 
Justice (Oxford University Press 2014) p. 141. See also p. 113 on the general rule-of-law principle 
of clarity. Furthermore, the Norwegian Constitution section 96 is interpreted to contain a clarity 
requirement, thus placing this principle at a constitutional level in Norway, see, among others, 
Gröning et al. (2016) p. 68 onwards.
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pending danger is intended to convey semantically. Secondly, it must be established 
how this phenomenon is to be identified, that is, based on what criteria it is to be 
assessed. Thirdly, it must be determined which factual assumptions this assessment 
should be based on. In the next sections, we shall examine how the legislator, legal 
theory and the Supreme Court might have shed light on this three-piece puzzle. 
3.2 Semantic Meaning 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Security has in the new proposal made use of an 
earlier definition of ‘impending danger of a future offence’ as ‘a sufficient degree of 
risk for recidivism, and the danger must at the time of the judgement be considered 
real.’34 This definition has been a matter of debate in legal theory. It has, for instance, 
been characterised as a tautology and criticised for not providing any further clari-
fications of its meaning.35 Considering that the term risk—arguably more so in Nor-
wegian than in English—bears close semantic resemblance to the term danger, this 
critique, at least prima facie, seems warranted. Looking to the variance in applied 
definitions in verdicts, this is no less so. 
In a Supreme Court verdict from 2003, the definition of impending danger as a 
sufficient degree of risk for recidivism and a danger that at the time of the verdict must 
be considered real, is referenced.36 Pointing to the verdict from 2003, the Supreme 
Court in 2004 also uses this definition.37 In 2005 the use of risk is abandoned and 
replaced with a new formulation stating that the danger of recidivism must be suf-
ficient and real, and that the requisite severity of danger can vary depending on the 
seriousness of the committed crime.38 In 2006 the new definition from 2005 is used.39 
In a second verdict from 2006, the risk definition from 2003 is again referenced.40 In 
2010 there is no mention of risk at all.41 In 2011 reference is made to the latter defi-
nition from the verdicts in 2006 with one alteration: the risk element is not includ-
ed.42 In the latest Supreme Court verdict there is no mention of risk, reference is still 
34 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) p. 141. This is the same definition as the one 
presented in governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 108. 
35 Syse, ‘Dømt til behandling – frikjent til fengsel. Nye strafferettslige ansvarsregler og 
særreaksjoner’, Nytt i strafferetten 1 (1997) p. 49 and Jacobsen (2004) p. 109 with further 
reference to governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 108 and commission report, 
NOU 1990:5 p. 86. 
36 Rt. 2003 p. 1085.
37 Rt. 2004 p. 1119.
38 Rt. 2005 p. 1091.
39 Rt. 2006 p. 1137.
40 Ibid, p. 1143.
41 Rt. 2010 p. 346.
42 Rt. 2011 p. 385.
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made to the second verdict from 2006, and a sufficient danger of recidivism is the 
applied clarification.43 A synonymous use of risk and danger thus seems to be taking 
place without clear definitions of how these phenomena are to be understood in the 
context of Penal Code section 62. As a result, the Supreme Court does not seem to 
escape the above-mentioned critique. 
The question regarding which criteria one is dealing with has also been given 
variable attention in the legal literature. In contrast to seemingly highly prevalent de-
bates on the topic within the common law jurisdictions, and despite the obvious rele-
vance of danger, the actual legal conceptual contents of this phenomenon have, until 
recently, received minimal attention in Norwegian legal literature.44 A symptomatic 
illustration is the thorough description of the danger assessment given in Matnings-
dal’s commentary to the Penal Code, but where no further specification is made of 
the phenomena this assessment is intended to reveal.45 
There are, however, exceptions, and a renewed interest in the danger phenome-
non has given rise to several alternative definitions of danger more generally, which 
can serve as a basis for a discussion on the contents of danger specifically in the con-
text of Penal Code section 62. 
In his commentary on the former Penal Code section 39 (which the current Pe-
nal Code section 62 upholds) Jacobsen, for instance, discusses danger to a greater 
degree and states (by referring to Jareborg) that danger can be understood as a pos-
sibility that something considered negative will happen.46 Danger is thus seen as an 
expression of a possibility-relation between one or more causal factors and the possi-
ble negative outcome.47 Impending is explained as a threshold for how probable/likely 
43 HR-2017-2249-A.
44 See Floud, ‘Dangeorusness and Criminal Justice’, The British Journal of Criminology, 22(3) 
(1982) pp. 213-228; Bottoms and Brownsword, ‘Dangerousness and Rights’, in J.W. Hinton 
(ed.) Dangerousness: Problems of Assessment and Prediction (George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1983); 
Pratt, Governing the Dangerous (The Federation Press 1997); Slobogin, ‘A Jurisprudence of 
Dangerousness’, Northwestern University Law Review 98(1) (2003); Ashworth and Roberts, 
‘Sentencing: Theory, Principle and Practice’, in The Oxford Handbook of Criminology, Fifth 
Edition (Oxford University Press 2012) pp. 888-890; and Ashworth and Zedner (2014). On the 
lacking discussion in Norwegian legal literature, see Gröning et al. (2016) p. 180, and Boucht, 
‘Politirettslig fare – særlig ved ordensforstyrrelser’, Tidsskrift for strafferett 4 (2018) p. 333. 
45 Matningsdal (2015) pp. 582-593. Similarly, the concept of danger delicts is explained in several 
Norwegian standard works on criminal law without danger as a phenomenon being defined. 
See, for instance, Matningsdal, Norsk spesiell strafferett (Fagbokforlaget 2010) p. 5. So also in 
Mæland, Norsk alminnelig strafferett (Justian AS 2012) p. 56. Somewhat more is said in Andenæs 
(2016) pp. 109 and 347, where in relation to danger delicts it is explained that the manifestation 
of a danger as an adequate result of the action is sufficient. Eskeland, Strafferett – 5th ed., by 
Alf Petter Høgberg (Cappelen Damm 2017) p. 195 explains that danger delicts often entail a 
requirement of the danger being induced in a certain way in addition to this behaviour being the 
cause of the danger.   




the danger must be, something that, according to Jacobsen, can hardly be assessed 
without taking the same elements as in the danger assessment into consideration.48   
Similar definitions may also be found in discussions on adjoining topics such as 
the Penal Code provisions that criminalise actions which give rise to danger (danger 
delicts) and in police law. In a standard work on criminal law, Gröning et al. explain 
how danger in earlier Norwegian literature has been defined as ‘an impending possi-
bility for a destructive effect’ and in Swedish legal literature as a demand that damage 
is ‘existentially possible’ and ‘plausible’, plausible meaning reasonable to expect rather 
than mathematically probable.49 Their own view is that danger in the context of dan-
ger delicts is a situation that: 
‘1. the offender has induced through a prior action, 
2. is outside the offender’s control, and
3. involves a possibility for damage.’50 
Løvlie also seems to see danger as a possibility-relation: 
‘A claim about danger inducement presupposes experience-based inferring linked to three 
conditions. Firstly, experiences needed to decide about claims regarding the behaviour 
specified as dangerous. Secondly, experiences regarding the behaviour’s possibility to 
damage protected legal values, often expressed as probability/likelihood. […] Whether 
the behaviour is dangerous can furthermore not be assessed in isolation, but expresses 
that one possible connection between phenomena is isolated, here behaviour and legal 
values, at the same time as other conditions are presupposed. […] It will depend on con-
stituting criteria what conditions may be presupposed.’51 
In a policing context danger is, according to Auglend and Mæland, understood as:
‘actual actions or conditions that, after an objective assessment and according to ‘the gen-
eral rules of life’, must be supposed will develop to an infringement of a politirettslig [po-
lice-legal] protected interest if the action or condition is allowed to continue unaffected.’52 
And consisting of three elements:
48 Idem. pp. 123-125 and pp. 107-108. A similar understanding of impending is expressed in 
relation to similar requirements in other legislation. See for instance Syse, Psykisk helsevernloven 
– med kommentarer (Gyldendal 2004) p. 130 on the requirement for civil commitment under 
the Mental Health Care Act (LOV-1999-07-02-62 om etablering og gjennomføring av psykisk 
helsevern) section 3-3 and Øyen, ‘Varetektsfengsling ved bevisforspillelsesfare’, Jussens venner, 4 
(2010) pp. 226-227 on a similar requirement for remand detention in the Criminal Proceedings 
Act section 182 ref. section 171 number 2.
49 Gröning et al. (2016) pp. 180-181 with further reference Asp et al., Kriminalrättens grunder – 
2nd ed. (Iustus 2013) p. 93. The author’s translation. 
50 Idem. p. 181. The author’s translation. 
51 Løvlie, Rettslige faktabegreper (Gyldendal 2014) pp. 160-161 with further reference to Andenæs 
and Goodman. The author’s translation. 
52 Auglend and Mæland, Politirett (Gyldendal 2016) p. 411, with further reference to Sjöholm and 
Henricson. The author’s translation. 
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‘(1) objective situational facts, (2) a requirement of an experience-based probability/like-
lihood and (3) the potential infringement object must be considered among the interests 
that are awarded politirettslig [police-legal] protection.’53 
In a recent paper based on a review of Nordic and German legal literature, Boucht 
argues that danger in a police-legal context, on a general level can be understood as 
a ‘state where a certain identified circumstance gives rise to a risk directed towards 
a politirettslig [police-legal] protected interest, that exceeds the commonly accepted 
risk, but where damage has not yet occurred.’54 Furthermore, he argues that there 
are good reasons to support a view of the police-legal danger concept as ‘saksforhold 
[circumstances of a case] that, if not prevented, will result in an objective course of 
events that, with sufficient probability/likelihood, is expected to entail an infringe-
ment of a polisiær [police-legal] protected interest.’55 However, after having discussed 
different dimensions of the politirettslige (police-legal) danger concept, he arrives at 
the conclusion that danger in this context can be summarised as:
‘saksforhold [circumstances of a case] that in a concrete situation, after a reasonable 
assessment ex ante from a normally cautious policeman’s perspective, gives reasonable 
grounds to believe that it will result in an infringement of a politirettslig [police-legal] 
protected interest within the foreseeable future.’56  
It is here worth noting, that Boucht’s definition of danger, unlike the others, includes 
a specification of the time-perspective.57
3.3 Provisional Definition 
Based on these definitions, we can construct four preliminary definitions of danger 
in the context of Penal Code section 62: 
1. Danger is a situation or state that creates a possibility for  serious future 
offences. 
2. Danger is a situation or state that makes future serious offences plausi-
ble.  
3. Danger is a situation or state that makes future serious offences proba-
ble/likely. 
4. Danger is a situation or state that creates sufficient risk that a serious 
future offence will occur. 
As we can see, while definitions one to three operate on the different modalities pos-
sibility, plausibility and probability/likelihood, definition four requires the determi-
53 Ibid. 
54 Boucht (2018). The author’s translation. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See the discussion on factual assumptions in section 5 below. 
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nation of a sufficient risk. Depending on the meaning attached to the alternatives, 
it is not immaterial which definition forms the basis for the rule. One could, for in-
stance, argue that it would take less to establish a fact as possible, rather than plau-
sible—let alone probable. In this way, the danger definition may directly influence 
which threshold applies. Unless further specified, a reference to danger, therefore, 
does not—at least in itself—constitute a clear framework for the danger assessment. 
The picture is further complicated when these alternative definitions are com-
bined with the previously described legal meaning of the term impending, i.e., as a 
threshold for how probable/likely the danger must be. Then, a somewhat confusing 
situation arises, where a probability/possibility assessment features twice in the as-
sessment of an impending danger. The rule seemingly requires the assessment of the 
probability/likelihood of what has itself already been defined as a possibility, plausi-
bility, probability/likelihood, or sufficient risk for a future offence. 
If we let the probability/likelihood threshold implied by impending consume the 
middle element (i.e., the possibility assessment contained within the definition of 
danger), this issue can be solved: 
5. Impending danger is a sufficient probability/likelihood that a situation 
or state will result in serious future offences. 
On a deeper level, this definition also might be considered ambiguous, as it does not 
make clear what kind of probability/likelihood, for instance within the dichotomy of 
objective and subjective probabilities, must be established for an impending danger 
to be considered present.58 Within the scope of this paper, this seems to be as close 
to a proposal for a semantically clear definition of danger as we can get. However, 
returning to the legislator and Supreme Court’s attempted definitions, another issue 
arises with the potential to capsize this attempt at further clarity altogether, that is, 
how are we to understand the many references to risk? 
3.4 What is a ‘Sufficient Risk’?
As seen in subsection 3.2, the requirement of impending danger has been defined by 
the legislator as a sufficient risk and a synonymous use of the terms risk and danger 
apparently takes place in Supreme Court verdicts. In the assessment of the require-
ments, the verdicts sometimes take a risk-based starting point and other times a dan-
ger-based starting point. But are the concepts of danger and risk really synonymous? 
58 See for instance, Aven and Reniers, ‘How to define and interpret a probability in a risk and 
safety setting’, Safety Science 51 (2013) pp. 223-231, and Taroni et al. ‘Reconciliation of Subjective 
Probabilities and Frequencies in Forensic Science’, Law, Probability and Risk, 17(3) (2018) pp. 
243-262. This is a topic for another discussion. Although acknowledging the issue, a continued 
reference to probability/likelihood, without further specification of which type, will therefore 
follow.
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If so, would this entail that the term risk here points to the same phenomenon as has 
been defined by the concept of danger? If not, it could mean that different phenom-
ena form the requirement for intervention in different cases. Yet another possibility 
is that risk, in some way, is involved as a criterion in a wider definition of danger as 
implied in the alternative definition four above. 
In their discussion on the concept of danger in the context of danger delicts, 
Gröning et al. (2016) argue that a distinction between danger and risk can be made 
based on the point of loss of control.59 This means that risk is connected to a situation 
where the offender has not yet committed an initiating act, and danger to a situation 
where the initiating act has been committed, and the outcome is out of the offender’s 
control.60 A similar distinction is made by Auglend and Mæland.61 Risk is, however, 
also a term with several possible meanings. Due to a growing ambiguity, it is not 
obvious what is actually meant whenever the term risk is used. This is particularly 
evident when considering how risk is defined across different settings. 
After its introduction in the mid-1970s, a definition of risk as a statistical expec-
tation value for unwanted events determined through the product of probability and 
severity has become the standard technical meaning of the term in many disciplines 
such as engineering, professional risk analysis and nuclear energy safety.62 However, 
as for instance shown by Hansson, acceptable uses of the term risk in technical set-
tings also include: 
‘[…] risk = an unwanted event which may or may not occur. […] risk = the cause of an 
unwanted event which may or may not occur. […] risk = the probability of an unwanted 
event which may or may not occur. […] risk = the fact that a decision is made under 
conditions of known probabilities (‘decision under risk’ as opposed to ‘decision under un-
certainty’) […].’63 
In security settings, e.g., terrorist attack prevention, a contextual definition with the 
threefold assessment criteria of asset/value, threat and vulnerability is common.64 
For the risk management setting, the International Standardization Organization’s 
current guidelines (revised in 2018) defines risk as the ‘effect of uncertainty on objec-
tives’.65 In the forensic psychiatry setting, risk has been defined as a multidimensional 
59 Gröning et al. (2016) p. 181-182.
60 Ibid.
61 Auglend and Mæland (2016) pp. 410 onwards. 
62 Hansson, Risk, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive (2018), with further references to 
Rasmussen et al. (1975) and Rechard (1999); Hansson, ‘Philosophical Perspectives On Risk’, 
Techné 8(1) (2004) pp. 10-35; and Lowrance, Of acceptable risk: science and the determination of 
safety (William Kaufmann 1976).  
63 Hansson (2018). 
64 Amundrud et al., ‘How the definition of security risk can be made compatible with safety 




entity specified as ‘a hazard that is incompletely understood, and thus its occurrence 
can be forecast only with uncertainty.’66 
In Norwegian legal literature, however, the classical technical definition of risk, 
as a function of probability/likelihood and consequences/severity, appears to be the 
leading candidate.67 This would suggest that when a danger requirement is defined in 
terms of risk, it is something that can be measured in terms of probability/likelihood 
(P) and consequences (C). This being so, when comparing the concept of danger to 
the traditional definitions of risk as a function of (P) and (C), it is still not obvious 
that the concepts here implied are identical. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to use sufficient risk and impending danger in a synon-
ymous way. (C) could be seen as referring to the feared serious future offences. Then 
(P) would have to cover both the situation/state element, the possibility-element, and 
the probability/likelihood that the situation/state will cause future serious offences. 
Sufficient might then be seen as a specification of how probable/likely the manifesta-
tion of this possibility must be for sufficient risk to be present. This indicates that risk 
is not compatible with the first and second danger definitions on its own, because, 
contrary to these definitions, risk implies a probability/likelihood assessment in it-
self. 
A sufficient risk, and an impending danger may, however, entail the same phe-
nomena if the suggested danger definition is applied and the (P)-element and suffi-
cient are understood in the way described above. Depending on how danger and risk 
are defined, a synonymous use of the terms might thus take place without necessarily 
changing the actual contents of the phenomena being assessed. Whether the legis-
lator and the Supreme Court actually have done so, is another question. As neither 
has provided a clear definition of what danger is supposed to entail, or how risk is 
supposed to fit in, this remains uncertain.
 
3.5 Preliminary Conclusion
It falls outside the scope of this paper to provide a full account of the different ways 
in which the phenomena of danger and risk can be defined. The discussion has so 
far nonetheless illustrated a lack of clarity caused by the legislator’s failure to pro-
66 Hart, ‘Evidence-Based Assessment of Risk for Sexual Violence’, Chapman Journal of Criminal 
Justice Vol. 1 (2009) pp. 143-165. Similar in Douglas et al. HCR-20 v3 – Assessing Risk for Violence 
(Mental Health, Law and Policy Institute, Simon Fraser University 2013). 
67 See Auglend and Mæland (2016) pp. 415-416 and Horn, Fullstendig isolasjon – ved risiko for 
bevisforspillelsesfare (Fagbokforlaget 2017) p. 307, with further reference to Strandberg, M. 
Beviskrav I sivile saker – en bevisteoretisk studie av den norske beviskravslærens forutsetninger 
(2012) p. 133; Søvig, Tvang overfor rusmiddelavhengige – sosialtjenesteloven §§ 6-2 til 6-3 (2007) 
pp. 268-269; Zahle, Om det juridiske bevis (1976) p. 195; Hjort, Tilgang til bevis i sivile saker – 
særlig om digitale bevis (2015) pp. 223-224.  
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vide a clear definition, as well as some problematic aspects of an uncritical synon-
ymous use of the terms danger and risk. In light of the several possible meanings 
implied by these terms, the requirement of impending danger may not be as clear as 
the rule might lead one to believe at first impression. What actual framework this re-
quirement provides for the court’s discretion, and to what degree the values of legal 
equality, predictability and clarity are upheld, is, therefore, at least up for debate. The 
Ministry’s intended shift towards a greater emphasis on the danger requirement can 
be expected to further increase the effects of any lack of clarity, thus jeopardising the 
mentioned rule-of-law values. Further efforts should therefore be made to solve these 
issues. 
The definition is, however, only part of the picture. The danger requirement may 
also frame the danger assessment by providing directions for how this phenomenon 
is to be identified. In Penal Code section 62, this has been done by specifying certain 
elements thought to be indicative of danger that are to be taken into consideration. A 
closer look at these might settle any worries about arbitrariness in the application of 
the rule. 
4. Indications of Danger
As we have discussed above, an assessment of danger, at least when danger is under-
stood in a certain way, may be said to include the determination of the presence of 
a situation or state that is considered to stand in some form of possibility relation to 
the feared consequences. Whether a particular person, at a particular time, is con-
sidered to pose a danger or not may, if the suggested clarification of the definition is 
accepted, to a large degree depend on what situation or state is considered to bring 
about the possibility of damage to the protected legal values.68 In Penal Code sec-
tion 62, directions for the relevant situation or state have been provided in the last 
sentence. It is here stated that in the danger assessment, ‘emphasis shall be put on 
the committed offence with a particular reference to the offender’s conduct, illness 
development and mental functional capacity.’ A closer examination of these indica-
tions follows. 
The legislator has acknowledged that it is impossible to achieve certainty that an 
offender will commit future offences if the special sanctions are not imposed, and 
that assessments of danger are encumbered with uncertainty.69 It has, however, also 
been presupposed that ‘dangerousness’ might be established to such a degree of 
probability/likelihood that the consideration of society’s need for protection can out-
68 Similar to what Løvlie (2014) describes as the second condition for danger inducement, see 
footnote 51. 
69 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) p. 135 and governmental proposal, Ot.prp. nr. 
87 (1993-1994) p. 60. 
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weigh the consideration of the individual.70 Although assessment of danger of future 
offences is not considered an exact science, in the case of criminally insane offenders, 
it is believed that there are relatively good indications on which a danger assessment 
can be made.71 
When examining these indications, that is, the criteria for the danger assessment 
in the final sentence of section 62, it is evident from the chosen words alone that the 
legislator has considered certain categories of criminal acts as fundamental in estab-
lishing the danger of future criminal behaviour. This has been confirmed in earlier 
preparatory works, where it is stated that the committed offence forms the basis for 
the danger assessment, and that the scope and nature of this offence may provide 
insight into the probability/likelihood that the offender will commit another similar 
offence.72 The view that an offender’s record of previous offences is an important fac-
tor in the consideration of what danger is present in the future, is upheld in the pro-
posal for revision.73 However, it is also emphasised that there is no automatic relation 
between criminally insane offenders committing one integrity violation and the oc-
currence of future integrity violations.74 Therefore, section 62 will continue to require 
that the following additional criteria are taken into consideration: the offender’s con-
duct, the illness development, their mental functional capacity, with the addition—the 
offender’s relationship to drugs. 
According to the legislator, conduct is to be understood as the behaviour both 
before and after the committed offence.75 Whether the offender has expressed oth-
er aggressive or criminal behaviour than the offence currently in question has been 
considered of special interest.76 Furthermore, it has been assumed that earlier violent 
behaviour strengthens the prediction of the danger of future offences, compared to 
cases where the offence in question is the offender’s first violent act.77 However, it is 
also pointed out that ‘dangerousness’ might be established already after one serious 
offence. 
Illness development could be understood as referring to the illness that gave rise 
to the exemption from criminal liability. It has been assumed that, in certain cases, 
there will be a causal link between this illness and the defendant’s ‘dangerousness’.78 
The expected illness prognosis is therefore also relevant to the assessment of the dan-
70 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp.nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 60. 
71 Ibid.
72 Idem. p. 107. See also footnote 26 on the required standard of evidence.
73 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L. (2016-2017) p. 141. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp.nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 107.
76 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp.nr. 90 (2003-2004) p. 459. 
77 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp.nr. 87 (1993-1994) p. 107. On the required standard of evidence, 
see footnote 26.
78 Idem. pp. 107-108.
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ger of recidivism.79 
The factor mental functional capacity is, according to the legislator, primarily 
aimed at mentally disabled offenders, but also for the mentally ill it is considered 
important to evaluate self-care ability, insight into the illness, and relationship with 
the outside world.80  
The reason given for the proposed inclusion of the additional factor of relation-
ship to drugs, is that experience supposedly has shown that substance use increases 
the risk for violence.81
At least two of these factors, illness development and mental functional capacity, 
concern the mental health of the offender. An application of the rule in accordance 
with the legislator’s intentions thereby requires that the jurist enter into a discipline 
usually occupied by other professions, employing specialist knowledge that neither 
the prosecution service nor the courts normally possess.82 A well-known solution is 
to bring the other professions into the legal domain using court appointed forensic 
experts. However, as mentioned in subsection 2.1, the forensic experts’ contribution 
is in practice not limited to an evaluation of these factors, but often also includes an 
assessment of the risk for violence. A glance at these contributions gives cause to 
worry about reliability. 
As of 2001, the Psychiatry Group of the Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine83 
has recommended the use of a structured profession judgement approach (SPJ) to vi-
olence risk assessments.84 Even though risk of future violence is a topic of concern 
79 Governmental proposal, Ot.prp.nr.90 (2003-2004) p. 459. 
80 Ibid.
81 The Ministry’s proposal, Prop. 154 L (2016-2017) p. 232. 
82 Gröning and Rieber-Mohn (2015) p. 123.
83 Whose tasks include training of forensic experts and review and quality assurance of the forensic 
expert reports submitted to the prosecution services and courts.
84 See The Norwegian Board of Forensic Medicine, Psychiatry Group’s newsletter no. 5 (2001) and 
onwards. The SPJ approach is characterised by the use of validated instruments to structure the 
experts’ assessment in regard to: the types of information that should be gathered; the standard 
set of risk factors to be considered; instructions for rating risk factors; guidance for making final 
risk judgments based on the relevance of the risk factors and the need for interventions; and 
the facilitation of risk management. The commonly used instruments are directly informed by 
both the scientific and professional literature, and the risk factors selected include dynamic risk 
factors that are necessary to engage in treatment and risk management planning. The applied 
structure separates this approach from the purely discretionary clinical judgement approaches 
sometimes characterised as ‘informal, subjective, [and] impressionistic’. Ref. Grove and Meehl, 
‘Comparative efficiency of informal (subjective, impressionistic) and formal (mechanical, 
algorithmic) prediction procedures: The clinical–statistical controversy’. Psychology, Public Policy, 
and Law, 2(2) (1996) pp. 293-323. The prevention focus and the degree of professional judgment 
exercised by the expert separates it from the typical actuarial approaches that are designed to 
generate a prediction of future violence within a specified population using algorithms for the 
weighing and combining of empirically selected risk factors.  
128
Martin Mindestrømmen
that the court appointed experts have expressed their opinion about in several of the 
Norwegian Supreme Court verdicts in our sample, no reference to the SPJ-approach 
could be found. One can therefore not help but wonder if there is a variation in the 
nature and quality of the experts’ contributions. Considering the material from the 
experts’ assessments to which the High Court has chosen to refer in verdicts under-
lying the Supreme Court cases in this analysis, and where reference to the SPJ-in-
strument HCR-2085 is made, it seems so. 
In LG-2010-11446686, the High Court, for instance, reference an actuarial risk-as-
sessment done with the use of the HCR-20:
‘The result in the HCR-20 assessment was a score of 20 out of 40, compared to 25 out of 
40 in 2006. The experts have in their comments to the test score explained that a reduced 
score indicates a lower degree of dangerousness, but have at the same time specified that 
this reduced score assumes that the current treatment regime is upheld.’ 
In LF-2006-2733187 the forensic expert, on a basis of the HCR-20, expressed the risk 
perceived with different scenarios: 
‘The forensic experts have, in the additional report regarding the question of danger of re-
peated offences, pointed to the forensic expert report of 5 February 2005, where it is stated: 
“In regard to the prognosis for danger of repeated offences, the forensic experts 
point to the HCR-20. The Subject has a relatively high score on historical data, 
and also on clinical data. If he were to be discharged without the possibility of 
treatment or follow-up, he will also receive a high score for risk for recurrence of 
criminal offences in the future. 
The conclusion is, therefore, that if the Subject is discharged to his own residence 
without an outer framework, there will be a significant risk for recurrence of 
criminal offences, both such criminal offences of which he is convicted and ac-
tions that he has admitted. 
With structured follow-up and treatment, in addition to a meaningful daily life, 
this risk will be considered reduced to medium.”
During the appeal proceedings the forensic experts have clarified that significant risk as 
used above is to be understood as high risk, ref. that the used classification system HCR-
20 groups the danger of recurring offences as high, medium or low. The forensic experts 
furthermore expressed that the presupposition of a meaningful daily life is considerably 
subjective and—thus implied—possibly difficult to realise for a person with A’s diagnosis.’
85 Webster et al., HCR-20 Assessing Risk for Violence version 2 (Mental Health, Law and Policy 
Institute, Simon Fraser University 1997), Douglas et al. (2013), and Norwegian translation by 
Hoff et al. HCR-20 v3 – Voldsrisikovurdering (Helse Bergen HF 2013). According to Bjørkly et 
al., ‘Norwegian Developments and Perspectives on Violence Risk Assessment’, Criminal Justice 
and Behaviour 41(12) (2014) p. 1391, the HCR-20 is the leading tool for violence risk assessment 
in Norway. 
86 Appealed to the Supreme Court and tried in verdict Rt. 2011 p. 385. 
87 Appealed to the Supreme Court and tried in verdict Rt. 2006 p. 1143
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In LB-2005-1292688, the main goal of the HCR-20 appears to be a categorising of per-
ceived risk in the absence of medication: 
‘The forensic experts in the autumn of 2004 made an assessment to predict the risk for 
future violence. The conclusion of this HCR-20 assessment is that, at this time, there was 
a considerably high risk that A would commit new aggressive actions against persons in 
the community. 
In the conclusion of the forensic evaluation it is, among other things, stated that: 
“The prerequisite for an optimal prognosis where the risk for new violent acts is 
minimal, is that the Subject is treated under involuntary psychiatric treatment. 
The essential treatment element is antipsychotic medication in depot form. The 
need for such treatment is lasting. 
The absence of such treatment will involve a bad prognosis with a considerably 
high risk for new violent acts.”’
For good reason, the reports issued by court appointed forensic experts are ‘often 
characterised as authoritative evidence’.89 Although the sample is admittedly small, 
and caution certainly should be shown in drawing any definite conclusions from it, 
the variances here illustrated are nonetheless disquieting and should be further in-
vestigated. 
Summarising this section, we may conclude that although section 62 specifies 
which indications the danger assessment should be based upon, and the legislator 
has explained how these are to be understood, challenges might still face the jurist 
when assessing whether these are present, as specialist knowledge is required to do 
so. 
From a clarity perspective, an additional challenge arises from the fact that dan-
ger may also apparently be established based on other factors than the ones listed in 
the rule.90 Illustrative examples may be found in the Norwegian Supreme Court ver-
dicts, e.g., in the second verdict from 2006,91 where the Supreme Court deliberates 
on the defendant’s housing conditions, medication, the mental health care already in 
place, and substance abuse in the danger assessment, thus including two factors not 
mentioned in the present rule. 
Contrary to the impression left by the rule itself, a distinct line separating the fac-
tors on which the definition of danger rests can therefore perhaps not be drawn after 
all. The hope that the provided specification of elements indicative of danger can 
settle the worries for arbitrariness must be adjusted accordingly.
 
88 Appealed to the Supreme Court and tried in verdict Rt. 2005 p. 1091
89 Gröning and Rieber-Mohn (2015) p. 123.
90 Jacobsen (2004) p. 112 with further references. 
91 Rt. 2006 p. 1143
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5. Factual Assumptions 
Neither the Penal Code itself, the legislator’s earlier preparatory works, nor the new 
proposal for revision provide clear directions on what factual assumptions and time 
horizon the danger assessment shall be based.92 As discussed in section 2.1 above, 
this could be problematic, as having different future scenarios as a basis for the dan-
ger assessment might actually imply different rules that can lead to very different 
conclusions on whether danger is present. 
One might reasonably interpret the legislator’s definition of impending danger to 
mean that a possible danger must be probable/likely to materialise within a certain 
time horizon. However, according to court decisions that draw comparisons with 
similar requirements in other statutes, this is not correct: 
‘The appellant has asserted that it in the requirement that the danger must be impending 
in addition to serious, lies a time perspective […]. 
I agree with the High Court’s statement on the legal interpretation: 
“The High Court cannot see that there are any grounds for support, in the legis-
lator’s preparatory works or other legal sources, for the view that the danger cri-
teria contains any limitation as here implied, and will add that it cannot be de-
manded that the danger will materialise within a clearly defined time horizon. In 
the High Court’s opinion, this also follows from the fact that the similar question 
for the treatment criteria is solved directly in the rule itself and is treated thor-
oughly in the legislator’s preparatory works. Several other regulations contain the 
limitation ‘impending danger’, among others the Penal Code section 39 (not in 
force), the Criminal Proceedings Act sections 171 and 198, the Immigration Act 
section 15 and the Enforcement Act sections 11-14. In all of these regulations the 
term ‘impending’ shall be interpreted as a clarification that the danger must be 
real and sufficient on the time of the verdict. This must also be interpreted as the 
contents of the Mental Health Care Act section 3-3. The time factor will, however, 
have to be included in the Court’s assessment of the concrete predictability. The 
further ahead in time, the lesser is the certainty that the danger will materialise.”
I am furthermore on the grounds of a concrete probability/likelihood assessment in 
agreement with the High Court that a discharge will entail a real and sufficient danger to 
others life and health […].’93  
As for the other factual assumptions, it has, following the Supreme Court verdict from 
2003,94 been argued that the danger assessment must have as its basis a hypothetical 
92 Jacobsen (2004) pp. 110-111.
93 Rt. 2001 p. 1481 (270-2001)
94 Rt. 2003 p. 1085, the prosecution’s appeal of the High Court’s acquittal of a man diagnosed with 
reactive paranoid psychosis, who in the district court had been sentenced to the former special 
penal sanctions after having murdered his cohabitant while criminally insane due to psychosis 
at the time of the act.
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worst-case scenario where the offender is not receiving any mental health treatment.95 
The following excerpt from the verdict’s paragraph 19 may serve as an illustration: 
‘It is apparent from the psychiatric declarations given in the case, further elaborated in 
the testimony of professor M.D. Berthold Grünfeld for the Supreme Court, that the dan-
ger that A again will commit a serious offence, such as homicide, is closely connected to 
the danger of a new psychotic outbreak. On the basis of the same psychiatric evaluations, 
I must assume that the danger of recidivism is imminent if A were to abort his treatment 
with antipsychotic medication, for instance due to failing motivation in the forthcoming 
phase of re-establishing as normal a life as possible outside an institution. […].’96
Furthermore, in paragraph 29: 
‘The immediately forthcoming phase of rehabilitation outside an institution will be a 
critical phase. A has never lived alone, and he will be exposed to challenges in a com-
pletely different way than has been the case in his shielded existence until now. In my 
opinion there is a real danger that in this phase a situation could occur where A will be 
less motivated to follow up the treatment with antipsychotic medication. In this picture it 
must also be taken into consideration that A has periodically had considerable problems 
with substance abuse.’
This also seems to be the starting point in later Supreme Court verdicts. In the ver-
dict from 2005,97 the Supreme Court further clarifies this outset: 
‘In my opinion there is a sufficient danger of aggressive behaviour if the involuntary med-
ication of A is discontinued, and an impending danger that he then again will commit 
a serious offence that violates or endangers the life, health or freedom of others. The de-
fence counsel has argued that this danger is not present at the time of the verdict, as 
the defendant already receives involuntary medication under the Mental Health Care 
Act. Even though the basis for the danger assessment is the situation at the time of the 
verdict, this assessment must, however, in my view also include the preconditions for this 
situation, ref. Rt-2003-1085 paragraph 29 onwards. Even though the defendant in that 
case was subject to voluntary mental health care, the verdict shows that it is necessary 
to consider the situation if this protection was to be discontinued. It is unquestionable 
that stability in the medication is a necessary precondition for there not being a sufficient 
danger that A again will commit serious violent acts. The requirement of danger is there-
by in my opinion met.’98
In 2006, this changes. This year, the Supreme Court makes two verdicts on the former 
Penal Code section 39 (now 62), the second of which constitutes a definite change. In 
the Supreme Court verdict Rt. 2006 p. 1137, sanctions were employed under the for-
mer Penal Code section 39 (now 62) after a criminally insane offender was acquitted 
95 Jacobsen (2004) p. 111, with further reference to Rt. 2003 p. 1085. 
96 Rt. 2003 p. 1085 paragraph 19.
97 Rt. 2005 p. 1091, where a man diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and paranoid psychosis 
had been convicted of murder by blunt violence.
98 Rt. 2005 p. 1091 paragraph 20.
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by the High Court99 on the grounds of criminal insanity (utilregnelighet) for several 
offences, including three counts of threats in violation of the former Penal Code sec-
tion 227. On the danger assessment, the Supreme Court concludes:
‘After an overall assessment of the offences committed by A, seen together with his histo-
ry, illness development, and mental functional capacity, my conclusion is that there is an 
impending danger that A again will commit a serious offence that violates or endangers 
other persons’ lives, health or freedom if society does not make provisions for his treat-
ment.’100 
Decisive for the Supreme Court’s confirmation of the High Court’s verdict of sanc-
tions under the Penal Code, was a lack of confidence that civil commitment under 
the Mental Health Care Act, administered by the hospital, would be sufficient for 
the protection of society. It could be argued that the Supreme Court, in asking what 
measures are necessary to avoid an impending danger of future offences, based the 
danger assessment on a best-case scenario, i.e., what measures must be in place for 
everything to go well. This situation is, however, different from the former cases, as 
the worst-case scenario—no treatment at all—was already in effect. It is, therefore, 
uncertain if this verdict can be interpreted in such a way.  
In the second verdict, Rt. 2006 p. 1143, the index offence was a recent minor 
assault, which was seen as closely correlated to an earlier serious aggravated assault. 
The expert witnesses had established a causal nexus between the defendant’s men-
tal illness and the violent acts committed. On several occasions, the experts had as-
sessed the defendant’s risk of future offences. In a forensic expert report from Febru-
ary 2005, it was concluded that a high risk of future offences would be present if the 
defendant was discharged to his own residence without further measures in place. In 
addition to consistent and structured living arrangements, as well as adequate med-
ication, avoidance of substance abuse was considered important to reduce the risk 
of future offences. In recent years, the defendant had been civilly committed under 
the Mental Health Care Act, and was regularly medicated without his consent. He 
visited the hospital once a week for depot medication and had mostly resided in his 
own residence, to which mental health care personnel made regular announced and 
unannounced visits. In the last quarter, the defendant had tested negative for illegal 
substance use. In July 2006 he was, however, discovered by the police intoxicated by 
the roadside, which led to a conversation at the institution the following day. There-
after, he was allowed to return to his own residence. The Supreme Court concluded 
that the defendant in later years had lived a relatively controlled existence, including 
frequent contact with and monitoring from mental health care personnel. The Su-
preme Court found that there was no evidence that this would change even though 
the defendant himself expressed discontent with the medication and lacked insight 
to his own mental condition. It is stated that: 
99 LA-2005-185582.
100 Rt. 2006 p. 1137 paragraph 24. Emphasis added.
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‘In assessing the question of danger of recurrence of such serious criminal offences as 
mentioned in section 39 no. 1, the psychiatric treatment regime encompassing the of-
fender, and under which it must be supposed that he will continue to reside, must in my 
opinion be given substantial weight. The requirement of ‘impending danger’ in section 39 
no. 1 ref. section 39c no. 1, is, in accordance with statements in Ot.prp.nr.87 (1993-1994) 
page 108, practiced such that the risk must be sufficient and real, ref. Rt-2003-1085.’101
On the basis of the mental health care regime already in place, the Supreme Court 
found that sufficient danger for the use of sanctions under section 62 was not pres-
ent.102 
However, in the following Supreme Court verdict from 2010103, a hypothetical 
worst-case scenario again seems to form the basis for the danger assessment: 
‘The experts’ assessment is that his prognosis is completely dependent on whether he will 
manage to stay away from substance use or not. They assume that he will experience a 
psychotic break after a few days’ use of, for example, amphetamine. Also, the use of alco-
hol will in their opinion indicate an obvious worsening of his prognosis with an expressed 
impulsivity and danger for violence. This is related to his serious dissocial personality 
disorder in addition to paranoid schizophrenia. 
A has since august 2009 been at the Fossen substance abuse treatment centre and has 
stayed clear of intoxicants during his stay there. It is, however, not certain that he will 
continue to do so if he does not have to. In light of his history of violence and threats, his 
mental condition and addiction, in conjunction with the fact that intoxication leads to a 
significant worsening of his condition, there is in my opinion an impending danger of a 
new offence that violates or endangers other peoples’ lives, health or freedom.’104
Another variation appears in a verdict from 2011105 on the continuation of sanctions, 
which appears to include both a worst-case and a best-case scenario. In the danger 
assessment, it is initially remarked that it is clear and undisputed that the danger re-
quirement would be met if the alternative to special sanctions under the Penal Code 
were that the defendant was to receive no care at all. In the following, it is nonethe-
less stated that other realistic treatment options must be taken into consideration: 
101 Rt. 2006 p. 1143 paragraph 21.
102 It should here be noted that what treatment measures are in place has been considered part of 
the necessity requirement by the legislator, see section 2 above. 
103 Rt. 2010 p. 346, where a man diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, dissocial personality 
disorder, opiate dependency disorder under treatment with methadone and hyperkinetic 
behaviour disorder, and with a history of violence and threats, had appealed against the High 
Court verdict of special sanctions under Penal Code section 62, after having found that he 
again—among other minor offences—had committed two serious threats while criminally 
insane due to psychosis at the time of the acts.
104 Rt. 2010 p. 346, paragraphs 24 and 25. 
105 Rt. 2011 p. 385, where a man diagnosed with chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia had been 
acquitted for the murder of four close family members in 1984 on the grounds of criminally 
insanity (utilregnelighet) due to psychosis at the time of the act, but sentenced to special sanctions 
under the Penal Code that were later upheld.
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‘In the assessment of an ‘impending danger’ that A will commit new violent acts, it must, 
however, be considered whether realistic treatment alternatives other than a verdict of 
continued involuntary mental health care are available. The defence counsel has, in rela-
tion to this, argued that A wishes to receive mental health care voluntarily, and that he—
if this is not considered sufficient—could be civilly committed under the Mental Health 
Care Act chapter 3.’106
Thereafter, the Supreme Court deliberates on the danger assumed based on the two 
alternatives and concludes that neither offers sufficient protection of society. 
As a result of the lack of guidelines given by the legislator, and the apparent vari-
ance in the scenarios that the Supreme Court considers, it remains unclear what fac-
tual assumptions of the offender’s situation in the future should de lege lata form the 
basis for the danger assessment. In light of the possible implications for the danger 
assessment, not to mention when the legal issue is that of continuation of sanctions, 
the room for unequal treatment thus created gives cause to worry.  
6. Reflections and Conclusions
In the discussion on the meaning of the danger requirement, I have argued that, de-
pending on how danger is defined and on what temporal and factual dimensions its 
assessment is based, alternative rules might result. Danger is, for instance, somewhat 
different when thought to entail a possibility for future offences, than when entailing 
a probability/likelihood for future offences. It is, furthermore, different when deter-
mined isolated from external circumstances, compared to when viewed as contin-
gent on given situations. Whether or not danger is considered present may also to 
a large degree depend on what criteria are set for its identification—what has been 
previously described as the situation or state element. 
Despite the legislator’s apparent efforts to frame the decision-making process 
through providing directions for the danger assessment, a preliminary analysis of 
legal sources has shown that the assessment is seemingly still approached in different 
ways in actual cases. Apparently, the courts exercise a substantial degree of discretion 
as to the legal meaning of the requirement. In doing so, no clear definition of the 
phenomenon is given, factors other than the ones listed in the rule itself are includ-
ed, and the future scenario forming the basis for the assessment varies. The rule in 
Penal Code section 62 might therefore be further from the rule-of-law ideals of le-
gal clarity, predictability and equality before the law, than one might initially expect. 
Considering the current legal landscape, I am not at all certain that different judges 
would reach the same conclusions, or even examine the same evidentiary topics, if 
presented with the same case. With regard to the intended greater emphasis on the 
danger requirement in the Ministry’s proposal, this is troubling. 
106 Rt. 2011 p. 385 paragraph 19.
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The concluding remark must be that further legal and conceptual clarification is 
needed if arbitrariness in court decisions on involuntary psychiatric treatment is to 
be avoided. Deciding upon a commonly accepted definition and a clear set of factual 
assumptions for the assessments would go a long way in that direction. At present, 
this might prove a difficult task, as there is currently no comprehensive conceptual 
framework for the application and assessment of danger and risk in a Norwegian 
penal legal context that can serve as sufficient basis for an informed discussion on 
possible alternatives and consequences. Developing such a framework requires more 
time and resources than is available to the legislator and higher courts. More re-
search in the field is therefore necessary.  
